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Abstract 
The largest group of migrants in Germany is the Turkish people, many of whom 
have low skills levels, are Muslim, and are slow to integrate themselves into their 
host communities. German immigration policy has been significantly revised 
since the early 1990s, and a new Immigration Act came into force in 2005, 
containing more inclusive stances on citizenship and integration of migrants. 
There is a strong rhetoric of acceptance and open doors, within certain 
parameters, but the gap between the rhetoric and practice is still wide enough to 
allow many migrants, particularly women, to fall through it. Turkish-Muslim 
women bear the brunt of the difficulties faced once they have arrived in Germany, 
and many of them are subject to domestic abuse, joblessness and poverty because 
of their invisibility to the German state, which is the case largely because German 
immigration policy does not fully realise a role and place for women migrants. 
The policy also does not sufficiently account for ethnic and cultural identification, 
or limitations faced by migrants in that while it speaks to integration, it does not 
fully enable this process to take place effectively. Even though it has made many 
advances in recent years towards a more open and inclusive immigration policy, 
Germany is still a ‘reluctant’ country of immigration, and this reluctance stops it 
from making any real strides towards integrating migrants fully into German 
society at large. The German government needs to take a much firmer stance on 
the roles of migrant women in its society, and the nature of the ethnic and 
religious identities of Muslim immigrants, in order to both create and implement 
immigration policy that truly allows immigrants to become full and contributing 
members to German social and economic life, and to bring it in line with the 
European Union’s common directives on immigration.  
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Introduction 
Germany has recently implemented a new Immigration Act (2005) after a 
lengthy process of negotiation and debate, and has been struggling with issues of 
self-definition related to whether or not it is indeed a ‘country of immigration’. 
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Germany has a long history of xenophobia and violence towards perceived 
outsiders, and has never really regarded itself as a country of immigration. This 
stance has been reformulated in recent years, and the federal government in 
2004, under the leadership of Gerhard Schroëder, declared Germany a country of 
immigration. German immigration and integration policy is now being 
reconsidered under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Christian 
Democratic Union, but no significant changes have been made to the 2005 Act as 
yet. Germany is thus an interesting case study in terms of the shifts that have 
occurred and are still occurring in thinking and policy formulation around the 
issue of immigration. It has been suggested that, as one of the biggest countries in 
the EU, Germany has a considerable amount of influence over policy-making at 
the supranational level, and that whatever it decides to do with its immigration 
policy will have an impact on the shape of European policy (Martin, 2001). 
Certainly this was borne out in 2003 when Germany foiled the EU’s plans to 
create a common immigration policy (Schlagheck, 2003). Germany provides us 
with an opportunity to examine some of the key challenges related to recruiting 
and integrating migrant communities with very different cultural and religious 
beliefs and practices to those of the receiving country, and also some of the key 
trends with regards to immigrant women and their particular problems and 
difficulties.  
 
The new German Immigration Law is designed to address demographic issues 
that are causing a decline in the number of working-age Germans entering the 
labour market, and a steady increase in the number of people leaving the labour 
market. Germany registered the lowest fertility rate in the EU in 1999, with an 
average of 1.3 children per woman, well below the 2.1 needed to maintain the size 
of the country’s population (Green, 2004). The EU’s collective population is 
expected to fall to below its current numbers by 2050, and similarly in Germany, 
as a result of current fertility rates, the German population is predicted to shrink 
from 80 million to between 60 and 70 million by 2050 (Green, 2004). To 
compound this, the combination of pensioners living even longer due in great 
part to advances in medical science and care, and fewer people working to pay the 
taxes necessary to maintain pension and health care systems will culminate in a 
social security and pension systems crisis at some stage during the first half of the 
21st century (Green, 2004). These factors combine to create a situation in which 
immigrants, preferably skilled, are needed to fill gaps in the workplace, and are 
desired to settle in Germany and have families that will continue to contribute to 
Germany’s social and economic future. 
 
However, in spite of the strong realisation on the federal governments’ part of the 
necessity of immigration, and a declaration of Germany as a country of 
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immigration, there is still a strong sense that Germany is reluctant to fully 
embrace its new political, economic and socio-cultural reality. There are still 
significant gaps between the rhetoric of immigration and the actual 
implementation, and again between the implementation and its recognition of 
the realities of Muslim immigrants’ lives. Germany has been recently criticised by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for 
admitting lower numbers of permanent immigrants than other Western 
European countries, thus neglecting the needs of the work-force, and for lagging 
behind other EU member states in admitting low-skilled migrants and 
recognising foreign qualifications (DW-World, 2008). It is also worth noting that 
the word ‘reluctant’ appears in quite a number of articles discussing German 
migration policy. This seems to relate, in the focus of this paper, to the 
integration of migrants into German society, and the recognition of migrants as 
part of the German citizenry and broader social and cultural context. This 
reluctance is particularly noticeable when one considers Turkish-Muslim women 
migrants and the ways in which they negotiate the policy and practice of 
immigration and then integration into their host communities. It is also related 
quite closely to the lack of obvious consideration in policy formulation and 
implementation of the specific, and firmly held, cultural and religious beliefs and 
practices of Turkish immigrant groups. 
 
This paper will argue, through a keen focus on the more significant problems and 
issues that Turkish-Muslim immigrant women confront during and after the 
process of immigration, that Germany cannot afford to continue its pursuit of 
limited and reluctant immigration and integration policies. This paper will look 
at the ways in which limited thinking on the part of German policy-makers about 
the kinds and nature of Muslim immigrants’ settlement patterns and religious 
and cultural affiliations, as well as the new requirements for gaining citizenship, 
constrains the practice of integration, to the extent that integration is happening 
at only a superficial level and fails to address the lived realities of Turkish-
Muslim immigrants in general and women in particular. This paper will consider 
various aspects of immigration policy that either exacerbate or attempt to solve 
problems related to immigration and integration, and will suggest possible 
solutions and policy adjustments that could be made to facilitate a less disruptive 
and discriminatory immigration process for these women and their families. For 
example, the issue of guaranteed rights and secure legal status is of particular 
importance to immigrant women. Many women enter the Union through the 
mechanism of family reunification and are thus dependent on their spouses for 
their livelihood. This dependent legal status is at the centre of the debate on 
immigrant women’s rights in the EU, and many of the other difficulties that these 
women face can be connected to this. It is also important to consider immigrant 
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women’s lives on various levels, and to view them not only as dependent wives, 
mothers and daughters, but also as independent workers and people in their own 
right. A great deal of the existing literature deals with immigrant women 
narrowly, and considers them only as dependents, and as secondary to men in 
the process of immigration. The paper will also briefly consider some of the 
possible implications of xenophobic and racist violence for immigrants’ 
integration and settlement patterns, and how the German government’s 
reluctance to actively prosecute offenders adds to the withdrawal of Muslim 
immigrants into their own narrow ethnic and religious spaces, preventing 
meaningful and long-term integration and immersion.  
 
A reluctant country of immigration – the evolution of immigration 
policy 
To better understand the construction of Germany’s immigration policy, and 
German attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, it will be useful to 
explore, briefly, the evolution of policy towards foreigners, known as 
Ausländerpolitik.4 Germany was one of the European countries that participated 
in the guest worker recruitment schemes of the 1960s and early 1970s. Known in 
Germany as Gastarbeider1, these workers came into the country from both inside 
and outside of the European Community, mostly from the Mediterranean region. 
One of the largest groups of guest workers, now one of the largest ethnic groups 
in Germany, was the Turks (Hillmann, 1999: 270). After the oil shock in 1973,2 
and the subsequent recession, Germany closed its borders firmly to labour 
migrants, and the Turkish immigrant population has grown since then as a result 
of natural growth and family reunification (Hillmann 1999: 270). Prior to the 
1973 ban, ‘four-fifths of all Turkish migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany3 
were men, usually without their families (Davis and Heyl 1986: 182). In addition 
to male workers, the Federal Republic before the ban ‘overwhelmingly’ recruited 
Turkish women, and these women responded in ‘considerable’ numbers, often 
migrating on their own (Rist 1978, quoted in Davis and Heyl, 1986: 183). Since 
1973, though, family reunification has been one of the only legal ways to gain 
entry into Germany, and most of the Turks migrating to join legally resident 
family members have been women and children (Davis and Heyl, 1986: 184).  
 
Germany began recruiting workers from both inside and outside of the European 
Community in 1955.5 The basic principle of labour recruitment was the 
employment of preferably young, single men who would fill gaps in the less 
skilled sectors of industry and agriculture. These young men would ideally be 
given short-term work and residence permits, and once the labour contract 
expired they would return to their countries of origin (Green, 2004: 33). It is 
estimated that a total of 14 million guest workers entered Germany between 1955 
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and 1973, of which about 11 million returned to their home countries. However, it 
became increasingly apparent that this was not a satisfactory system for both 
employers and unions, who wanted to avoid the costs of training new workers 
every few years, and the risk of foreign labour ‘undercutting’ the German 
workforce through cheaper contracts respectively (Green, 2004: 33). Guest 
workers began to receive permanent contracts, and there was increasing 
regularisation and settlement of foreign workers, but, remarkably, there was no 
formal legal framework for foreigner’s residence in place until 1965. 
 
The 1965 Ausländergesetz6 replaced the 1938 Nazi-enacted 
Ausländerpolizeiverordnung, but did little to improve foreigner’s rights to 
residence. It placed the power firmly in the hands of the German state, giving it 
the power to decide whether or not a foreigner’s presence in the country was in 
the ‘Federal Republic’s interests’, and thus effectively made it easier for the state 
to both deny and revoke residence permits (Green, 2004: 35). This interpretation 
of the power relationship between the state and non-national residents, with the 
state firmly in control, came to be central to policy debates in subsequent 
decades. This version of the Ausländergesetz remained in force until 1990, 
although some revisions and alternate policy directions were considered during 
the early 1980s. Underlying these revisions was the position that Germany was 
‘not a country of immigration’ and was not seeking to ‘increase the number of its 
citizens through naturalisation’ (Green, 2004: 40). This reluctance to admit 
foreigners to German citizenship and to define itself as a country of immigration 
has been a feature of Ausländerpolitik even in the most recent round of policy 
debate and restructuring. The key feature of the 1980s Ausländergesetz review 
process was the restriction of migration for the purposes of family reunification. 
 
During 1981, the government began to search for ways to restrict the migration of 
dependants of the largely male guest worker population. This type of migration 
was not covered in the 1965 Ausländergesetz and since 1973 it had become a 
significant source of immigration. The government decided to act to limit the 
conditions under which spouses could immigrate, and specifically aimed to lower 
from eighteen the age up to which children of foreigners could migrate to 
Germany (Green, 2004: 44). The restrictions applied then to family reunification 
then still largely apply today, and involve issues like housing, income and 
employment. To explain briefly, the settled (male) spouse must have housing of a 
certain size and legal employment that brings in a certain income before the 
German government will consider an application for family reunification. As in 
many European countries, finding adequate and affordable housing, especially in 
the larger cities where wages for immigrants are higher than in the less urban 
areas, but still lower than those of the non-immigrant population, is difficult. 
  
6 
 
Thus, even though family reunification is a legal method for immigrating to 
Germany, it is not an easy method, and the Ausländergesetz in many ways 
ensures this. The policy was only reviewed again in 1990, when, under the 
leadership of Helmut Kohl, it was revised. 
 
The key driver behind the 1990 revision was the integration of permanently 
settled foreigners, whose poor legal situation increasingly began to occupy the 
German political agenda. While the German government recognised the need to 
integrate existing immigrants and improve their legal and social standing 
through awarding permanent work and residence permits and increasing the 
range of socio-economic rights available to them, they were also reluctant to 
allow any further immigration to West Germany, and attempted to work 
restrictions on new immigration into the policy, a move that was widely rejected 
and that delayed further policy reform substantially (Green, 2004: 60-62). The 
final draft of the Ausländergesetz made only a few meaningful changes. For 
instance, the prerequisite of adequate living space for family reunification was 
relaxed slightly, and it made naturalisation a simpler and cheaper process7, 
allowing first-generation immigrants with over fifteen years’ residence access to 
this simplified process for the first time (Green, 2004: 71). Most of the gains 
made for immigrants were incremental, and not really enough to ensure a more 
secure legal status.  
 
The 1990s did not really see greater integration of the existing immigrant 
population and instead bore witness to a rise in xenophobic tendencies towards 
immigrant groups, and a resultant increase especially in larger cities like Berlin in 
the number of ‘ethnic enclaves’8 where immigrants could retreat into the safety of 
their own ethnic groups. The growth of the non-national population throughout 
the 1990s and into the 21st century, characterised by relatively low levels of 
naturalisation and higher levels of natural growth and family reunification, 
largely the means by which immigrant women enter Germany, has continued to 
make integration a pressing political issue. The formation of the EU in 1992, and 
subsequent EU-level directives on immigration and integration culminating in 
the Communication on community policy, as well as Green Papers on economic 
migration and demographic change coupled with the formation of the Women’s 
Committees in the European Parliament and the European Women’s Lobby 
among others, have made integration of immigrants a supra-national as well as 
national political issue. The need to re-open European borders to controlled 
labour migration made the need for another reformulation of Ausländerpolitik 
and the Ausländergesetz even more important for the German government in the 
early 2000s, when this process began, and is still vital today, as we begin to 
examine the implementation successes and failures of the 2005 Immigration Act. 
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The New German Immigration Policy and its relevance for Turkish-
Muslim immigrants  
The current German federal government is led by the coalition of the Social-
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian democrats - the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union 
(CSU) (hereafter CDU/CSU/SPD) - which is broadly pro-cultural homogeneity 
and therefore uncomfortable with rights-based immigration and integration 
discourse. The previous German federal government until 2005, the government 
that succeeded in passing the new Immigration Act of 2005, was led by a broadly-
speaking Leftist in political orientation, pro-immigration and integration 
coalition between the SPD and the Green Party (the SPD/Greens). During their 
first period in office (1998-2002) under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the 
SPD/Greens introduced two crucial legislative initiatives in both citizenship and 
immigration policy which promised to completely redefine the structures, aims 
and methods of this policy area (Green, 2004: 9). This was welcome news for 
non-nationals, many of whom had been living in Germany for over twenty years 
in 19989 yet still did not have access to rights and benefits comparable to those 
enjoyed by German citizens, and many of whom have to confront racial and 
xenophobic prejudice and violence in their daily lives. Certainly the SPD/Greens’ 
intention was to overhaul immigration and citizenship policy, and immigration 
policy has thus been renamed and revised since 1998.  
 
Now known as Zuwanderungsgesetz,10 re-characterising non-nationals as 
immigrants rather than as foreigners, the policy has made some major 
improvements on the old Ausländergesetz. However, critics of the policy argue 
that because of the way power is divided in Germany between the federal 
government and the Länder or states, giving the leaders of the latter enough 
power to redirect and change proposed legislation, and because of the sway the 
CDU/CSU coalition held, and still holds, over public opinion where immigration 
is concerned, the new Zuwanderungsgesetz is less wide-ranging and progressive 
than the SPD/Greens wanted it to be. In its initial form, the bill ‘was to regulate 
new, high-skilled labour migration, introduce new formal courses for non-
nationals, improve the situation for refugees and provide a simplification of 
Germany’s complex residence policy (Green, 2004: 111). After being negotiated in 
the Bundesrat11 for a significant period of time after its introduction in 2002, the 
Immigration Act was finally passed in June 2004, and the new 
Zuwanderungsgesetz came into effect in January 2005. The SPD/Greens had to 
make several compromises in order to push the final bill through both the upper 
and lower chambers of parliament, and thus the final product does not provide as 
much for non-nationals as it perhaps could have. It also leaves immigrant women 
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in a precarious position in some cases, although in a few instances it assists them 
more than the proposed EU policy does.  
 
There are three key areas that need to be examined and interrogated further: the 
first is that, while measures have been taken to ensure more focused and 
widespread integration of immigrants through language and civic education 
classes that the federal government pays for, the policy does not seem to have a 
major impact on the integration of Turkish-Muslim immigrants in their lived 
reality. The second is that, while the new policy does mention women, it leaves 
many gaps through which these migrant women can fall, at great costs to 
themselves and also to the German state – women are not focused on clearly or 
specifically enough in the policy. The final critique of the policy focuses on its 
unwillingness or inability to focus clearly and meaningfully on the social 
environment into which immigrants are asked to integrate themselves. 
Xenophobia and racist violence, based as it is on fear or aversion to a perceived 
‘other’ is a serious obstacle to the full integration of immigrants, and ensuring 
their full immersion in German social, economic and political life. Linked to this 
problem is the issue of citizenship, which is still a contentious issue in Germany.  
 
Integration and immersion of immigrants  
Integration of immigrants into German cultural, social and political, as well as 
economic, life is a big focus of the 2005 Act, and presents a substantial challenge 
to the federal and state governments. Recent polls in Germany show that only 
one-third of Muslim immigrants actually want to integrate (Poggioli, 2008) and 
experts argue that Muslims ‘integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims’ 
(Bisin et al., 2007: 1). Muslims have a stronger documented intensity of religious 
identity than non-Muslims. Their education levels do not seem to affect their 
identities – achieving higher levels of education does not seem to make them less 
attached to their particular religious and cultural beliefs and the identities thus 
derived – and ‘job qualification as well as living in neighbourhoods with low 
unemployment rate seem to accentuate rather than moderate the identity 
formation of Muslims’ (Bisin et al., 2007: 3). Further to this, discrimination, and 
xenophobic attitudes directed against them, consistently generates intense 
identity for Muslims (Bisin et al., 2007). This desire on the part of Muslims to 
move to Germany but remain within their narrow ethnic enclaves, which are 
formed through a high degree of internal solidarity and mutual assistance, as well 
as resistance to out-marriage, residential self-segregation, and cultural 
segregation from the host community (Hillmann, 1999: 268), presents an 
enormous and complex challenge for the German state, and for German society. 
They cannot force immigrants, Muslims in particular, to integrate and immerse 
themselves in German life, but without significant and meaningful integration, 
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the kinds of abuse suffered by Muslim women, and the kinds of xenophobic 
violence directed at immigrants groups and their defenders (think of the recent 
murder of Theo van Gogh and the attacks on Indian immigrants in Germany in 
2007) will continue and even intensify. The 2005 Act does take this to heart, and 
has made some positive steps towards moving from rhetoric to practice.  
 
One positive thing the Zuwanderungsgesetz ensures is more visible efforts to 
integrate incoming immigrants through language and civic education classes. 
From now on, ‘all newly arriving immigrants are entitled to attend language and 
integration classes’ which have previously only been available to Aussiedler13 
(Munz, 2004). These language classes are a very important focus of the policy 
documents on integration because ‘[l]anguage is the key to integration. Language 
skills alleviate the access to and the participation in societal areas; they are 
fundamental for successful education and increase the chances for the integration 
to the labour market’ (quoted in Heinrich, 2007: 13). There is also provision for 
special integration classes for women – since 2007 the German government has 
become far more proactive and interested in concentrating on the successful 
integration of immigrant women, as officials believe their empowerment can 
facilitate the integration of their communities – and husbands and children – 
into the mainstream (Heinrich, 2007; Poggioli, 2008). The cost of these classes 
was originally going to be partially carried by the immigrants themselves, but in 
the final version of the bill it is stated that the federal government will carry all of 
the costs. The language used is slightly ambiguous; it is stated that immigrants 
are ‘entitled’ to attend these classes, which will teach them the German language 
as well as aspects of German political and cultural life, yet it is more accurate to 
state that they are ‘obligated’ to take the classes. New and long-term immigrants 
who fail to complete these courses may find some of their social benefits being 
withheld, or may even have residence permit renewals denied (Munz, 2004; 
Heinrich, 2007). Thus, while the federal government is certainly shouldering far 
more of the responsibility for integrating immigrants, especially women, into 
German social and cultural life than it did prior to this, it still places a great deal 
of the onus for integrating on the shoulders of immigrants, some of whom may 
not be able to take advantage of these courses without adequate support from the 
government, and some of whom may choose not to do so.  
 
A rational examination of the requirements of immigrants to attend integration 
and language classes, particularly in the case of women, may reveal some 
challenges that could impede immigrant women’s participation. It would be 
particularly difficult, for example, for women immigrants to take language and 
civic education courses if they have children at home that need care, and if they 
have husbands or fathers that are reluctant to allow them to have extended 
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contact with other immigrants or German nationals. Day care costs in Germany 
are high, and there are long waiting lists for places in many day care centres. 
Newly arriving immigrant women thus need support from the government in 
providing them with reliable childcare arrangements while they take these 
courses. Women (and men) who move immediately into jobs upon arrival need 
compensation for any time taken off from work to attend courses, and the 
childcare needs apply if courses are held in the evenings. The German 
government also needs to find ways to impress upon their husbands and fathers 
the importance of allowing women and girls to take these courses. The reporting 
of attendance and the implications of non-attendance on residence extension and 
naturalisation processes could go some way towards ensuring their compliance 
with the laws (Heinrich, 2007).  
 
The availability of these courses to immigrants is an important step in the 
direction of successfully integrating immigrants into German society, but it needs 
to be implemented in such a way as to provide immigrants with the viable 
opportunities to take advantage of them. This part of the new law provides 
integration courses for newly arriving immigrants, but what about immigrants 
who have already been resident in Germany for some years and are unable to 
properly integrate because these opportunities have never been open to them? 
There is no apparent mention of free integration classes for already-resident 
immigrants, and no mention of withdrawing any of their social benefits if they do 
not choose to attend. Further, these courses are only offered in areas where there 
are large groups of immigrants, usually large cities and towns, and they are only 
available to legal immigrants – thus asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented 
women are excluded from these provisions (Heinrich, 2007). Certainly now that 
classes are open to all immigrants settled non-nationals should be encouraged to 
take advantage of these classes as part of a wider integration strategy, as it is 
apparent from some of the literature that even immigrants who have lived in 
Germany for as many as thirty years do not speak enough German to truly 
integrate into social and cultural life, mostly because they tend to live in ethnic 
enclaves and speak their native languages among their kinspeople.14 
 
This new, more open position on integration reveals that the federal government 
is aware of the fact that immigrants struggle to integrate themselves into German 
cultural and social life, especially if they are unable to speak German. Women, in 
particular, suffer from isolation, especially those from more conservative cultural 
and religious backgrounds, like Muslims. While it is extremely difficult for the 
federal government to legislate for the private sphere, as is the case with the 
common EU framework, it has become apparent that many young Muslim 
women immigrating to Germany as wives and daughters are vulnerable to 
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isolation and abuse that is invisible to the wider ethnic and German community. 
The government has attempted to take a stand on these issues, for example, 
denying both teachers and other public officials the right to wear headscarves at 
work in an attempt to enforce secularism (Spiegel Online, 2005). Many young 
Muslim women are prevented by their families from finding work or learning the 
German language, measures that would assist them in making friends and 
‘staking a claim’ in their new home country – particularly in the case of long-term 
immigrants. Spiegel Online, a popular German political periodical, reported in 
November 2004 that ‘social workers estimate that thousands – perhaps tens of 
thousands – of Muslim women live as invisibles in Germany, their lives physically 
defined by the walls of their home and ordered by four staples: the Quran, male 
superiority, the importance of family, violence and honor’ (Spiegel Online, 2004). 
It is not clear how mandatory integration and language classes will help these 
immigrant women to escape from domestic violence, abuse and isolation. While 
equipping young women with the skills necessary to better negotiate life in 
Germany is arguably an essential part of an immigration policy, it is not enough 
to prevent the human rights abuses and exclusions that many of these young 
women endure.  
 
Having considered the steps taken in the immigration policy to integrate 
immigrants, particularly women, into German society through language and civic 
education classes, I will not examine the particular challenges facing Turkish-
Muslim women in Germany, and begin to show up some of the shortcomings or 
oversights in the current policy. 
 
Dependent legal status and derived social and economic rights for 
Turkish women 
The German federal and Länder governments are coming under increasing 
pressure from women’s rights organisations and legal rights organisations to find 
a solution to the growing problem of protecting especially young Turkish-Muslim 
women from abusive family situations where their rights are ignored and abused, 
and where there are abused too. The costs of continuing to ignore Turkish-
Muslim women’s particular circumstances are rising. These costs are partly 
related to the funds that the German federal and Länder governments are 
investing in immigrant women’s shelters and legal and other aid and counseling 
for immigrant women across Germany. There are a growing number of shelters 
around Germany that ‘cater specifically to immigrant women… [and] [t]he 
majority of these organizations receive government support or funds in one form 
or another (Elbaum, 2006). Many of the women assisted are of Turkish-Muslim 
descent, escaping abusive home situations (Elbaum, 2006; Poggioli, 2008). 
Domestic violence against women in the Turkish-Muslim immigrant 
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communities is rife – a German government report published in 2004 claimed 
that ‘49 percent of Turkish women had experienced physical or sexual violence in 
their marriage’ (Poggioli, 2008). Further, in the last decade there have been 49 
reported cases of honour killings12 (explain this in endnote first time you us this), 
16 in Berlin alone (Poggioli, 2008). However, in spite of the widespread nature of 
this abuse, and the apparently lengthy periods of time over which the abuse is 
suffered by some women, this information is not widely known in Germany, and 
very little has been said about it in terms of federal or state policy. It is clear that 
there is a big problem here that the immigration policies, both those currently in 
place, and those that have been developed since 1998, are not able or willing to 
address.  
 
Women’s rights activists in Germany argue that German legal and political 
stances are condescending towards Islam, in that they try to account for Muslim 
religious and cultural beliefs and practices in an attempt to be inclusive, but what 
they end up doing in the process is denying women especially basic human rights, 
like the right to live free from sexual and physical abuse (Poggioli, 2008). 
Turkish-Muslim women find themselves in particularly difficult space. Many of 
them come to Germany as wives and young mothers, having been forced into 
arranged marriages with older cousins or other relatives at a very young age, and 
then moved to Germany. Many of these young women are unhappy and suffer 
abuse at the hands of their often much older husbands, many of whom believe 
that they need to keep their wives (and daughters) safe from the ‘evils of Western 
secular societies’ (Poggioli, 2008). Once in Germany, they try to find a space for 
themselves away from their unhappy and constrained home lives, and many end 
up dating German men, or working outside of the home or family business, and 
trying to lead more normal ‘Western’ lives. These women have to leave home to 
do this, as they are unable to stay for fear of retribution or further abuse and 
because many families would never allow or sanction such choices. Many women 
then, it is argued, live behind walls of silence; many are uneducated and illiterate 
in the social and cultural practices of their host country, and are unable to 
integrate because they are not fluent in German and are unable to leave their 
silent ‘prisons’. Many also fear leaving their cultural and religious practices 
behind because within them is an element of safety – it is what they know and 
have known all their lives.  
 
At the heart of the matter is a complicated dance between Germany’s inability to 
fully embrace immigrants, many of whom were invited Turkey to fill labor 
shortages, and the immigrants’ unwillingness to let go of behaviors and traditions 
that appear brutal to mainstream Western Europeans. Critics of Germany’s 
record with guest workers say that the country has been standoffish with the new 
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residents, leaving them clinging to their homeland’s culture for a sense of 
familiarity and belonging, a phenomenon particularly true among Muslim 
immigrants (Elbaum, 2006). 
 
The challenges facing immigrant women in Germany may seem new, but Turkish 
women have been migrating to Germany for as long as their male counterparts 
have, and they faced similar legal and social barriers to the ones facing current 
migrants. Feminist migration theorist Elenore Kofman argues that in Germany in 
particular during the period of guestworker recruitment, between 1960 and 1973, 
there were many single and married working women, often without their 
children, present ‘on the books’ as it were (1999: 4). From 1964 onwards, one 
quarter of labour migrants from Turkey were women, and by the early 1970s they 
formed the single largest group of female labour migrants (1999: 4). In spite of 
their considerable presence, as a result of women largely being regarded as 
incapable or unlikely to be independent labour migrants in their own right, and 
as a result of the fact that most women who have entered Europe since 1973 have 
done so as dependents through the process of family reunification, women 
confront greater difficulties than men do in obtaining independent work and 
residence permits. Kofman states that this ‘dependency makes women 
particularly vulnerable to the regulations of nationality law and confirms the 
failure to treat women as members of society outside of their familial roles. Their 
rights are thus derived from their male sponsors’ (1999: 7). Other feminist 
migration theorists pick up these issues. F. James Davis and Barbara Sherman 
Heyl argued, in 1986, that the subordinate status of women in Turkey migrates 
with guest workers into Germany, although there is greater space in the country 
of settlement for changes in the family structure to occur that may move women 
into a more egalitarian relationship with men (Davis and Heyl, 1986: 179). They 
argue that when Turkish women move into Germany they confront what they call 
‘threefold discrimination’, which basically means that they are discriminated 
against because they are Turks, women, and migrant foreigners (1986: 179). 
Discrimination against migrant women in particular stems in part from the fact 
that, in spite of increasing numbers of migrants entering their borders, most EU 
member states still struggle to view themselves as active countries of 
immigration, welcoming migrants in both policy and practice.  
 
Part of the problem in Germany, as at EU level, is that women are not necessarily 
awarded an independent right to work and residence if they arrive as dependants 
through family reunification. Before dependants are even given leave to travel to 
Germany for the purposes of reunification, certain conditions have to be met 
pertaining to housing size and stable employment and income. In many cases, 
spouses are only allowed to travel to Germany if the resident partner has a 
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settlement permit, or has had a residence permit for at least five years, and only 
children up to the age of sixteen are allowed to join their parents in Germany.13 
Further, after the spouses’ reunion, the dependant has to wait in many cases from 
three to five years before an independent residence permit is awarded, and also 
for a work permit (EG-MG(1996)02rev+11: Part II, V.a.ii). 
 
In many cases, particularly for Turkish-Muslim immigrant women, this 
dependency makes them more vulnerable to abusive domestic situations from 
which many are unable to escape. Even though divorce or separation can be 
grounds for deportation before this period of time is up, residency rights can now 
be extended to women who leave their marriages, provided that the marriage was 
in place for two years after moving to Germany. In addition, authorities are given 
the discretion to extend residency rights to women who leave their husbands 
before the two-year period expires as a result of domestic violence and abuse (A 
Manual for Germany, Foreigners from Non-EU states: family reunion). Even 
though this is a valuable step towards empowering immigrant women legally, 
women who migrate as dependents do struggle to achieve independent rights and 
legal status, and many are unable to leave abusive situations because they are 
unable to find the help they need, legally, socially or otherwise. In addition to 
domestic abuse, a lack of independent rights to work forces many immigrant 
women into undocumented and unprotected labour, which may result in 
economic and physical abuse as well. 
 
In the case of Turkish-Muslim women, religious as well as social considerations 
impact on their ability to leave abusive marriages. Some women, particularly 
young women, may be forced to enter into arranged religious marriages before 
they reach the age of majority, usually eighteen, and research seems to suggest 
that many young women who enter Germany as dependants are subjected to 
arranged marriages within their ethnic enclaves. It is difficult for the federal 
government to legislate in cases where religious and cultural customs prevail. In 
2007, for example, a Frankfurt judge refused a request from Muslim woman for a 
fast-track divorce on the grounds that the Koran disallowed such violence. This 
may have seemed like a form of religious tolerance, but in fact it allowed the 
judge to effectively dismiss that woman’s rights (Poggioli, 2008). In spite of clear 
difficulties in applying secular Western law to specific religious and cultural 
contexts, the German government’s stand on secularity could be extended to a 
general stand that privileges basic human rights and freedoms over religious and 
cultural practices that may restrict said rights and freedoms. For example, it has 
been suggested by groups that advocate for Turkish-Muslim women’s rights that 
the federal government strengthen the laws governing the admission into 
Germany of Turkish-Muslim women who enter as young brides. For instance, 
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women should be at least 18 years of age, and must be required to take language 
classes upon arrival. In addition, arranged marriages should be forbidden and 
there need to be means with which to prosecute parents who force their children, 
particularly their daughters, to marry against their will (Spiegel Online, 2004). In 
addition to providing language training, it is vital to provide immigrant women 
with opportunities for education and skills training that may be denied them in 
their country of origin. 
 
It is apparent from data collected in many EU member states that Muslim women 
entering the Union suffer from high illiteracy rates, and low levels of skills 
training. It has been suggested that, especially in rural and peri-urban areas 
where family-run businesses may require unpaid family labour in order to make a 
profit, there is non-enforcement of schooling for girls. Girls are also not 
encouraged, in general, to seek out tertiary education and advanced skills 
training, as they are required to remain within the home after marriage. This 
general lack of education follows these women to Germany, particularly first 
generation immigrant women who are often more isolated than their daughters 
and granddaughters, and less able to move outside of their enclave because of 
their inability to interact with others in German, among other reasons. Thus, an 
important part of an overall immigration and integration strategy for Turkish-
Muslim women is education and mandatory language training. All immigrant 
women must be encouraged to take language classes, and opportunities must be 
created to allow women to take advantage of these courses, such as assistance 
with childcare and with reluctant husbands and fathers who may not permit 
attendance. Experts argue that is it essential to introduce human and women’s 
rights education in grade school, to teach immigrant children a more liberal, 
rights-based view of society and to enable them to understand as they grow older, 
how German social and legal standards are set and regulated (Spiegel Online, 
2004; Elbaum, 2006). In addition to grade school cultural and civic education for 
immigrant children, I argue that ethnic German children should be educated 
regarding human and women’s rights. They need a civic and cultural education 
that will give them greater knowledge and insight into immigrants’ culture and 
customs, even if only in a general sense. The federal and Länder governments to 
need to promote the exchange of information and ideas between native German 
and immigrant groups, which would further encourage successful long-term 
integration.  
 
While providing women with language training and various job training and 
education opportunities is important, it is not enough. Turkish-Muslim 
immigrant women and indeed many immigrant women in general find it difficult 
to enter the workplace. There are restrictions in place that make it difficult for 
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many immigrants, both men and women to find work at their particular skills 
levels, and immigrant women suffer from high rates of unemployment. What is 
needed are mechanisms to encourage both job training and job placement at 
appropriate skills levels, and immigrant women need more active representation 
locally, provincially and nationally at federal level. If the government awards 
immigrant women independent work permits upon arrival, and facilitates their 
acceptance into training programmes, in addition to formally recognising any 
skills and qualifications they have brought with them, these women will be 
equipped with the tools to find and take on appropriate employment, both inside 
and outside of their ‘ethnic enclave economies’. An ethnic enclave economy is 
described as a ‘geographical cluster of ethnic firms with vertical integration of co-
ethnic manufacturers, workers and consumers’, also considered to be a substitute 
environment for the immigrants insofar as it had the capacity to provide them 
with a path for upward mobility (Portes and Bach, 1985 quoted in Hillmann, 
1999: 268). ‘Reciprocal obligations’ and ‘ethnic solidarity’ are seen as key 
elements of this kind of economy, and Felicitas Hillmann argues that these 
economies are growing and becoming important to the overall European 
economy. She also states that there is a significant amount of hidden and unpaid 
labour done by women in family-owned businesses, and that even though the 
enclave can technically provide women with employment, it does not support 
professional advancement for women in the same way it does for men (Hillmann, 
1999: 269). A further disadvantage of enclave employment for women is that the 
enclave ‘provides women with very low wages, minimal benefits and few 
opportunities for advancement’ (Gilbertson, 1995: 668, quoted in Hillmann, 
1999: 269).  
 
Hillmann’s brief study of Turkish women entrepreneurs in Berlin suggests that 
entrepreneurship can give women unique opportunities to create a supportive 
and successful work environment for themselves in a labour market that is 
difficult to access. Greater support for women entrepreneurs would help many 
immigrant women to gain more financial and social independence and 
integration. By support what is meant is more banks willing to secure loans for 
women entrepreneurs, and more financial support for organisations set up to 
assist immigrant women with starting and running a business. While 
entrepreneurship does tend to push women out of their homes and into the 
workplace, both as employers and employees, there is little support or no support 
for these women at home. Many women carry a double burden because after their 
paid work is done their unpaid work at home with household and child-care 
responsibilities is still waiting (Hillmann, 1999: 269). Therefore I argue that an 
important part of any job creation and training initiative for immigrant women 
needs to include provision for affordable and reliable childcare to ease the double 
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burden borne by so many women and to free them to really capitalise on any 
work opportunities they make have access to.  
 
Linked to this discussion on ethnic enclave economies, and ethnic 
entrepreneurship within these economies, is the suggestion by Der Spiegel that 
part of the solution to the problem of integrating immigrants is to break up the 
Turkish-Muslim ‘ghettos’ (Spiegel Online, 2004). Ghettoisation allows the 
immigrant community to isolate itself as a whole, furthering ignorance of 
German social, cultural and political life and of the German language. It allows 
ethnic enclave economies to flourish, and while these are important to the EU 
economically, they enable the enforcement of unpaid work for women and may 
keep women away from job training and work opportunities that would allow 
them to experience life outside of the ghetto. The people who suffer most from 
ghettoisation are the youth, who need to integrate themselves into German 
society in order to feel that Germany is their home. The argument is that if they 
are able to integrate into a wider German community, over the long-term 
younger generations will feel less inclined towards an extremist affiliation to their 
ethnic group and will remain in Germany, working to contribute to the economy 
and raising families that will stave off serious demographic decline EG-
MG(1996)02rev+11: para. 79). Perhaps one way to break up ethnic enclaves, 
forcing Turks to integrate further with the wider German community, would be to 
require entrepreneurs to serve a certain number of clients outside of their 
enclave. This requirement could be added in the Zuwanderungsgesetz in the 
section on entrepreneurs, who now have the opportunity to obtain work and 
residence permits provided they meet certain criteria (Munz, 2004). This may 
help Turks to create a wider social and economic network on which to build and 
could give women employed in ethnically isolated businesses exposure to the 
wider community and mitigate some of their cultural isolation and invisibility. 
Another way to assist women to both integrate successfully, and to find support 
and assistance with issues ranging from domestic abuse and childcare to business 
training and advice, is to create and fund women’s organisations in areas with 
high concentrations of immigrants, like the big cities and towns. 
 
Women’s organisations require support from the federal government, which 
needs to take the human rights abuses suffered by immigrant women seriously. 
This would involve making funding available for further research into Turkish-
Muslim women’s experiences of the process of immigration, and settled life in 
Germany, and funding for programmes like education and skills training that will 
enable these women to find paid work both inside and outside of their ethnic 
enclaves. It would also be beneficial to the cause of immigrant women’s rights to 
find ways in which to allow immigrant women to participate in their own political 
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representation at local, provincial and national level. Part of the social citizenship 
that legal immigrants are accorded is certain obligations to the German state, like 
paying taxes and contributing to pension schemes. But another part of social 
citizenship is obligations to immigrants by the German state, such as providing 
access to work, housing and social welfare, as well as ensuring that immigrants 
have a voice that is heard in appropriate forums. Perhaps a start could be to hold 
local conferences and workshops where women’s NGOs and immigrant women 
could work together to present immigrant women’s issues to a wider forum, and 
begin a campaign of awareness and information-sharing that would have long-
term benefits for both immigrants and the host population. Non-immigrant 
citizens would learn more about immigrants, in particular Turkish-Muslim 
immigrants, and immigrant women would be able to meet people outside of their 
enclaves, learn more about the communities in which they live and empower 
themselves through active participation in political and social life.  
 
According to Alice Schwarzer, a prominent German women’s rights advocate, the 
subjugation of women, and especially immigrant women is a political, not a 
cultural issue. She argues that immigrant women deserve rights and Germans 
need to stand up and fight for them. In her words: “A society in which a male can 
put down another only because she is female – such a society is at its core an 
unfair society” (Spiegel Online, 2004). I would add that any society in which one 
person can put another down simply because that person is an immigrant is also 
at the core an unfair society, and Germans need to realise that ignoring 
immigrants’ voices and denying them rights is not going to make immigration 
less of an economic and social reality. Valuable though the interventions and 
provisions made in the 2005 Act are, they can only help to a limited extent if the 
federal and Länder governments are not going to shift their position on 
immigrants to create a much deeper and more meaningful commitment to 
welcoming them into German political, social and cultural life. Integration has to 
go beyond prescribing and paying for language classes and civic education 
courses. It even has to go beyond awarding and extending residence permits and 
work permits. If Germany, like other EU member states, continues to regard 
itself, even privately, as a reluctant country of immigration, as I believe it still 
does, then no number of policy improvements and changes are going to really 
alter the reality of migrants, and migrant women’s, lives. Xenophobic tendencies 
towards immigrants in Germany are strong, and widespread, and new right-wing, 
anti-immigrants groups are forming and gaining in strength. This is a serious 
problem that needs to be addressed. The disjuncture between what is written into 
law and how those laws are interpreted and lived is wide in parts of Germany, 
particularly where the conservatives hold sway. I do not believe that Germany can 
address the significant need to integrate and immerse immigrants in cultural, 
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social and political life without seriously rethinking its deep-rooted and 
fundamental attitude towards ‘others’. 
 
Xenophobia and the need to take account of immigrants’ lived 
realities 
Xenophobia and right-wing extremism is Germany is on the rise, and people who 
hold right-wing views are drawn from all sectors of society – young and old, 
employed and unemployed, middle and working class. A survey conducted in 
Germany in May and June of 2006 showed that almost a quarter of the 5000 
respondents agreed with xenophobic statements, and the number was higher in 
eastern Germany (Spiegel Online, 2006). The report on the survey concludes that 
these numbers are significant and xenophobia often leads to right-wing 
extremism and violence, and that is a ‘scandal’ that far-right views are so 
prevalent. ‘Right-wing extremism is not an individual problem but one of society. 
…The fact that it has come to this touches the foundations of democratic society’ 
(Spiegel Online, 2006). A recent attack in 2007 on eight Indian men in Műgeln, 
in the former East Germany, has sparked a heated debate about the extent and 
depth of right-wing extremism and xenophobic sentiment in Germany, 
particularly in the former East Germany. This debate is instructive in regards to 
the kind of social and cultural environments immigrants are moving into and 
integrating with, and can go some way to explaining why, in spite of the more 
inclusive and open policies, Muslim immigrants in particular and very resistant 
to ‘cultural integration’ (Bisin et al., 2007). 
 
The debate centres on whether or not the attack was racist, or motivated by right-
wing extremism. An examination of comments made by newspapers and 
politicians on the left and right of the political spectrum provides a very clear 
indication of the dichotomy between the German federal government’s zero-
tolerance policy on such behaviour, and what is actually happening and being 
tolerated in many parts of Germany. On the one hand, the centre-right 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports that:  
 
It is almost symptomatic for failed integration in Germany that Turks and other 
immigrants are clearly under-represented at street and village celebrations, 
compared to their presence elsewhere. Just the fact that a group of Indians were 
partying and dancing with the locals in a beer tent after midnight is a point in 
Mügeln's favor. That would probably not have happened in other small towns 
with right-wing extremist problems. But now Mügeln is being depicted as just 
such a hotbed of racism in the media reports which have made the town infamous 
overnight. The talk is of a race-hate attack on Indians, of racist slogans and an 
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applauding mob of onlookers. The police task force should clarify what really 
happened (Spiegel Online, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, the center-left Berliner Zeitung writes:  
 
The attack on eight Indians by approximately 50 Germans is a scandal, but the 
evil in Mügeln is not yet over. The mayor of the municipality played down his 
original statements one day after the incident: If the act was committed by right-
wing extremists, then they came from somewhere else, and he did not hear the 
racist slogans which others reported. … There have always been brawls at street 
parties -- fights have been part of the celebration for centuries. But in the case of 
Mügeln the violence was directed against foreigners, against an outwardly 
recognizable minority, and not against the usual drinking buddies. The 
epistemological hair-splitting of the German authorities therefore looks like an 
appeasement. The attack, the curious onlookers who did not intervene, the late 
arrival of the police and then the authorities' attempts to play down the incident -
- are they not all characteristics of one and the same culture? (Spiegel Online, 
2007). 
 
Looking at these two very different accounts of the same event, one can see that 
the tendency of the right is to downplay the fundamental understanding of the 
Indian immigrants as outsiders to that place and situation – as the ‘Other’ – and 
to highlight an arguably false sense of Műgeln as welcoming to immigrants. The 
comment seems to be blaming the media for over-emphasising the xenophobic 
motivation for the attack, to try and ignore that it exists. The tendency of the left, 
in comparison, is to acknowledge that there is indeed too much ‘epistemological 
hair-splitting’ and that what is needed is a shift in the culture – a fundamental 
shift in not only policy-making but also in attitude at all levels of society. This is 
indeed an overwhelming challenge for a country that has a deeply troubled past 
where immigrants and foreigners are concerned, and that perhaps finds itself 
stuck between the necessity of immigration and the unwillingness to confront the 
accompanying reality in full. 
 
Dietrich Thränhardt and Robert Miles argue that immigration is indeed a 
’structural necessity’ (1995:1) for Europe at present, and will continue to be so in 
the future. There is no longer a need in Western Europe for mass unskilled labour 
migration, and thus immigrants are now more stringently screened and 
potentially excluded than they would have been during the 1960s and early 1970s 
when such a need was present. Underlying immigration and integration policy at 
both national and supra-national level are utilitarian economic considerations 
and racist conceptions of ‘otherness’ (Thränhardt and Miles, 1995: 3). Unskilled 
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and poorly educated migrants are a potential drain on already overtaxed pension 
and welfare systems within member states, and these migrants are perhaps more 
likely to be the target of racist attacks as they are particularly difficult to integrate 
through the usual routes of work and training programmes. This raises a key 
issue at the heart of particularly German debates about migrants and their 
inclusion into German society: citizenship rights. 
 
Key to the logics of inclusion and exclusion is the issue of citizenship. Labour 
migrants immigrating to other EU member states from countries within the 
union, for example, Italians moving to Germany, are subject to the logic of 
inclusion through the acquisition of ‘Euro-citizen status’.. Labour migrants who 
move into the EU from countries outside of the Union, even those that are 
connected to the EU through OECD and European Economic Community (EEC) 
membership, like Turkey, are not citizens and thus are subject to the logic of 
exclusion (Thränhardt and Miles, 1995: 8). Christian Joppke argues that 
citizenship is not only a set of rights, but also a ‘mechanism of closure that 
sharply demarcates the boundaries of states’ (1999: 629), and that in spite of this, 
citizenship is ‘indispensable for integrating immigrants’ and must thus be 
reframed (629). Germany has gone some way towards reframing citizenship 
rights, shifting the basis for awarding citizenship from ius sanguinis (blood ties 
to Germany) to ius soli (residence in Germany). The government, in 2000 passed 
laws that give all children born to foreigners resident in Germany citizenship 
status, provided one of their parents has been a permanent, legal resident for at 
least 8 years prior to the birth (Oezcan, 2004). Dual citizenship is held until the 
child is 23, at which time they have to decide which citizenship they would prefer 
to hold, and give up the other. Long-term permanent residents are now also 
eligible for citizenship, although stringent conditions need to be met in order for 
this to be awarded, related to housing, employment and demonstrable civic 
knowledge and language ability. These revised and more open citizenship laws 
are an important step towards greater integration of migrants, and many feel a 
very necessary one.  
 
There is, however, a growing debate around the issue of ‘post-national 
membership’ of EU member states, which, it is argued, has rendered full 
citizenship unnecessary for immigrants, who through the obtainment of a strong 
form of social citizenship now have sufficient rights and become successfully 
integrated into their ‘host’ communities (Joppke, 1999: 630). Thomas Faist 
defines social citizenship as the medium that allows immigrants to share in the 
economic and social benefits and responsibilities awarded to citizens of a state, 
like paying tax and drawing welfare payments, without any of the accompanying 
political rights and responsibilities, including the right to vote and run for 
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political office. Faist argues that the ‘main difference between citizens and non-
citizen immigrants concerns the type of social benefits’ they are awarded (Faist, 
1995: 178-179). He states that Germany has been an example of an ‘ethno-
cultural exclusionary model’ of immigration and integration (Faist, 1995: 179), as 
such allowing settled immigrants to become full members of the economic 
community, but previously denying these immigrants the right to full citizenship 
because of its insistence on descent as the basis for citizenship over residence. 
Further he argues that Germany requires its immigrants to demonstrate a high 
degree of cultural assimilation in order to make an application for full citizenship 
but has only very recently made specific provisions for integrating and 
assimilating immigrants into German cultural life, as this paper has 
demonstrated. Faist argued for a policy of ‘reciprocal immigration and 
integration’ (1995: 190), where immigrants will learn the German language, 
immerse themselves to a significant extent in German cultural life and form a 
voluntary and lasting affiliation to Germany as state and nation, while the 
German state will make achieving citizenship through naturalisation a realistic 
goal for migrants through provision of language and culture courses, and 
opportunities for migrants to immerse themselves in their host communities. 
This goal is in sight, as these language and culture courses are in place, but as this 
paper has shown, there are significant challenges to creating these opportunities 
and achieving the required level of immersion of immigrants necessary for them 
to demonstrate the language and cultural knowledge needed to apply for and be 
granted citizenship. 
 
Proponents of social citizenship argue that exclusionary citizenship no longer 
matters because former guest workers have achieved ‘safe membership’ of the 
nation in terms of permanent rights to work and residence. Joppke questions this 
argument, claiming that in spite of acquiring social citizenship rights and 
benefits, full political citizenship will remain an integral part of integrating 
immigrants, particularly from second and subsequent generations for whom 
xenophobic and racist violence is a very real threat, and that social citizenship 
will not be sufficient to protect immigrants from racist and xenophobic 
harassment (Joppke, 1999: 637). Current literature on the future of international 
relations in our increasingly globalised world suggests that this assessment is 
accurate.  
 
International Relations theorists point to forces of integration and disintegration 
pulling against one another. As the world becomes increasingly globalised, 
particularly with regards to trade and economic cooperation, we see a growing 
global culture, where people in very different socioeconomic spaces can watch the 
same Hollywood movies, wear the same brand-name clothes, connect and share 
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through websites like Facebook and MySpace, and listen to the same music. 
Linked to this, of course, is the fact that various forms of liberal, capitalist 
democracy are found in all states in the West, and are being introduced in 
developing parts of the world, and the former Eastern Bloc states, like new EU 
members states Lithuania, Belarus and Slovakia. Coupled with this is a growing 
argument for a form of global citizenship, which the EU to some extent embodies 
with its supranational character; one can be a German citizen but at the same 
time see oneself as European. These three elements, coupled with increased 
economic and military cooperation, create a more integrated and interdependent 
global space. But, at the same time, there is increasing evidence of disintegration 
– the fracturing of societies and polities along ethnic and cultural lines. The voice 
of the right-wing in Western Europe is becoming louder and more people are 
listening to what the right wing politicians have to say on immigration and 
integration polices and debates. There is a growing groundswell of support for 
these parties, like the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) in Belgium, The National 
Front in France and the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party in Germany. In 
Cologne, Germany, a group of young people with their roots in the nationalist 
sentiments of the far right have launched an anti-Islamic party that is inspiring 
other similar movements across Germany. These young people protest against 
Muslim immigrants in their communities, evidenced for example the building of 
mosques, and play to citizens’ fears of a ‘Muslim invasion’. They have gained 
enough support to warrant their surveillance by the Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution, which fears they may gain sufficient support to claim 
parliamentary representation in 2009 (Brandt and Kleinhubbert, 2008). 
 
It is not too extreme, I believe, to claim that xenophobia and right-wing 
extremism in Germany is a serious, and deeply-rooted problem. It is not, as I 
have argued in previous research, a significant threat to immigration, as the 
statistics will show. It has been acknowledged, though, that attacks like the one in 
Mügeln are damaging Germany’s regional and national reputation, and could 
pose a threat to future investment, and could begun to persuade potential 
immigrants to move elsewhere. Germany is lagging worryingly behind the rest of 
the EU member states in implementing the EU’s directives on investigation and 
prosecution of racist and hate-related crimes. This directive was issued in 2000 
and Germany implemented it in 2006. This does not signify a government that is 
willing to make immigrants at home in Germany, and it does not inspire much 
confidence in Germany’s ability to really close the gap between the rhetoric of 
immigration as a reality and the implementation of the policies that make it so.  
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Conclusion 
By the end of 2002, over 7.3 million non-nationals were resident in Germany, 
accounting for approximately 8.9% of the population including almost 2 million 
Turks, the largest immigrant group (Green, 2004: 5). Women account for almost 
half of the total immigrant population in Germany, as well as over 40 percent of 
the Turkish population (Hillmann, 1999: 270-271). Turkish women were 
recruited before the 1973 ban on Gastarbeider recruitment, and many married 
and single women responded, often moving alone to Germany to work in mass 
industry and in agriculture (Davis and Heyl, 1986: 183). Since 1973, women have 
been migrating to Germany, and the EU at large, through the mechanism of 
family reunification. This has resulted in a bias in much of the mainstream 
literature on migration in Europe, which tends to regard women as dependent 
migrants only, incapable of moving independently of men, and for the purposes 
of labour, skilled or unskilled. This paper focuses on immigrant women, and in 
particular Turkish-Muslim immigrant women who are dependent on their male 
sponsors, as this is an area where women’s rights are tenuous, and largely 
unconsidered by German immigration policy. 
 
Germany has a strong background of ethno-cultural solidarity and often-violent 
exclusion of those who do not belong in the dominant ethnic and cultural fold. 
The SPD/Green government planned for and negotiated the new Immigration 
Law since it gained power in 1998 as part of an attempt to write a new German 
history – one that is inclusive of and welcoming towards other ethnicities and 
cultural groups – and while it did not succeed in passing all the reforms it 
originally planned for, it succeeded in making some valuable changes to the 
status of immigrants in Germany. The most valuable reform is that regarding 
integration, specifically the provision of language and civic education classes for 
all incoming immigrants. Other reforms to allow entrepreneurs to gain work 
permits under certain conditions and to extend residence rights to women, even 
if they have separated from their husbands, before they have earned independent 
rights of residence and work permits, are also important steps towards 
recognising the contribution immigrants can make to German economic, social 
and cultural life, and awarding them comprehensive socio-economic right 
 
There are, though, areas where Germany still fails to take seriously enough the 
issue of immigrants’ rights, and the rights of immigrant women in particular. 
Germany in particular has a very large Turkish-Muslim population, and since 
1996 has witnessed 49 documented honour killings perpetrated against young 
Turkish-Muslim women by male members of their own families (Poggioli, 2008). 
The German government has attempted to take a stand on secularism over 
religious fundamentalism, but the efforts made thus far have not been sufficient 
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to truly provide for and protect the rights of these and other immigrant women. 
Turkish-Muslim women are often isolated from the wider German communities 
in which they live, and are by-and-large invisible victims of arranged marriages, 
unpaid family labour and in many cases domestic violence and abuse. An 
important part of the solution to these difficulties faced by immigrant women is 
to award those entering Germany as dependants independent work and residence 
permits, so that they do not have to stay in abusive relationships, or take unpaid 
or undocumented work which makes them vulnerable to further abuse and 
exploitation. Suggestions for other parts of an overall solution include 
strengthening laws that govern the admission of Turkish-Muslims to prevent 
underage and forced marriage; mandatory and supported language and civic 
education for incoming women immigrants; job training and job creation 
programmes for Turkish women, including support for entrepreneurial 
opportunities; and the de-ghettoisation of ethnic enclaves while creating wider 
support networks for women who need help moving outside of the enclaves to 
find work and residence. Working immigrant women also need assistance in 
finding affordable and reliable childcare to alleviate the ‘double burden’ of having 
two full-time jobs both outside and inside of the home, and to enable them to 
take advantage of any job training and creation programmes they may have 
access to. 
 
The first, and most important issue that immigrant women confront is their 
dependent legal status. Women who enter the EU and Germany for the purposes 
of family reunification are allowed to do so because their husbands have 
residence or settlement permits and legal work that enables them to support their 
families. In Germany very strict conditions apply in terms of housing and 
financial support for dependents before applications for reunification are 
approved. On arrival, these women are awarded dependent residence status, and 
in most cases are only allowed to apply for their own independent permits after a 
period of between three and five years (EG-MG(1996)02rev+ 1: part II; IV). They 
therefore have no independent legal standing, holding derived rights only. This 
lack of equal legal standing with immigrant men, and the citizens of the host 
country, creates a broad situation in which women are vulnerable to different 
kinds of physical, emotional and economic abuse in the workplace, in the home 
and within their host communities.  
 
In addition to problems directly related to their dependent legal status, and in 
spite of policy provisions, immigrant women in the EU also struggle to obtain 
language training in German, and also have difficulty accessing job and skills 
training that would enable them to find paid work relevant to their skills levels. 
Immigrant women will continue to remain isolated and invisible within host 
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communities unless they are able to meet people outside of their ethnic enclaves, 
and they need to speak German in order to do this successfully, for social and 
economic purposes. Immigrant women also have low participation levels in the 
workplace, possibly due to a combination of religious and cultural factors that 
may prevent women from finding paid labour outside of the home, and cultural 
and racist discrimination that may exclude them from certain sectors of the 
labour market where they could find such work. Immigrant women, most of 
whom do not hold political citizenship in their countries of residence, may 
struggle to find political and social representation, particularly in countries like 
Germany that have a long history of anti-immigrant sentiment. This lack of 
representation can lead to a lack of wider awareness of the difficulties facing 
immigrant women in Europe, and a lack of funding and support for initiatives to 
assist immigrant women with assuring their legal status and rights, education 
and training and access to the labour market. 
 
An obvious first part of an overall solution is to award immigrant women 
entering member states independent rights of residence and work permits, either 
immediately upon arrival or after a much shorter period of time. Lack of 
independent legal and residence status often forces abused women to remain in 
their marriages to avoid being deported, at least until they are able to apply for 
their own permits. One way in which Germany has attempted to prevent long-
term domestic abuse is to make provision for the awarding of independent rights 
of residence to women who leave abusive marriages before the specified time 
period is up. Another part of the solution for women, after awarding them 
independent rights to work and reside in Germany, is to educate them. 
Mandatory language education upon arrival in the host country is something 
Germany has incorporated into their legislation relating to integration. In 
addition to language education, it was suggested, specifically for Turkish women 
in Germany, but applicable to all immigrant women in the EU, that job training 
and job creation programmes need to be created for minority immigrant groups 
of women who suffer from comparatively high levels of unemployment, and who 
struggle to find work commensurate with their skills levels. I argue that in 
conjunction with this important initiative, immigrant women need assistance 
with finding affordable childcare, and in some cases housekeeping help, so that 
they can take advantage of training and job opportunities without being unduly 
constrained by their work and responsibilities at home. It is also essential that 
cultural and language education be emplaced in grade schools, for both 
immigrant and native European children, to teach the values of cultural diversity, 
and to ensure more successful integration of immigrant families as a whole. For 
many immigrant Muslim women, intervention is also needed with their husbands 
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and fathers, many of whom are resistant to the immersion of women into 
German cultural and social life. 
 
Therefore, immigrant women need access to better support networks in the form 
of legal aid and advice, women’s shelters and call centres that can offer them 
assistance in cases of domestic abuse and violence, and labour support to prevent 
exploitation and discrimination in the workplace. Many of these organisations 
and institutions do exist, but their work needs to be better supported by both 
federal and Länder governments, and by German society as a whole. Another 
important part of immigrant women’s integration and emancipation is more 
visible and audible representation of immigrant women’s issues and interests at 
the level of the European Commission and the European Parliament, and at the 
level of national and provincial government in Germany. The Women’s 
Committees of the European Parliament and the European Women’s Lobby are 
achieving a level of exposure for immigrant women’s issues at the supranational 
level, but there are few immigrant women on these committees, if any, and more 
of these women need to be encouraged to represent their own interests and form 
women’s organisations that can be supported politically and financially. 
Immigrant women need to be encouraged at national level too, to be become 
more involved in representing their own interests socially and politically. 
 
Germany has had difficulty drafting legislation that has a visible effect on the 
private sphere, where Muslim women especially are vulnerable to abuse, 
violence, isolation and exploitation. Germany has taken a stand on secularism, 
forbidding teachers and other public officials from wearing headscarves to work. 
The federal government has also signed and ratified CEDAWi6, which entails a 
commitment to preventing human rights abuses against all women. While there 
is no specific legislation in the Zuwanderungsgesetz to prevent private sphere 
abuses of women’s human rights, a great deal of which is unseen by the majority 
of the host population, suggestions that the government begin to screen 
admissions of Turkish-Muslim immigrants to ensure that young women are not 
entering the country as underage brides in arranged marriages have been made. 
It has also been suggested that the government set the legal age for religious 
marriages at 18, and put in place legal mechanisms to prevent arranged 
marriages for young girls and women. These would be important steps towards 
ensuring that the rights of young Muslim women are protected and ensured. 
 
Another area where Germany has struggled is in the prevention of uprisings of 
xenophobic and right-wing extremist sentiments. It is clear from numerous 
reports in German online newspapers, chief among them Spiegel Online, that 
right-wing sentiment, and outbursts of violence and active discrimination against 
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immigrant minorities, are a significant obstacle to the successful and willing 
integration and immersion of immigrants into their host communities. If indeed 
right-wing political groupings are able to gain political representation, Germany 
could be facing a much more difficult fight against these divisive and damaging 
sentiments and the actions based upon them. It is very important for the German 
government to continue to examine and interrogate the processes through which 
permanent work and residence permits and citizenship are awarded, and must 
continue to make a firm commitment to valuing the human rights of immigrants 
by taking a visible stand against violence perpetrated against immigrant 
minorities, and against immigrant women. Violence against immigrants by 
German nationals, and violence against immigrants by their own kinsmen must 
be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, and these laws must have at their 
core a fundamental recognition of and respect for human rights over any 
religious or cultural concerns.  Although it is undeniably important to respect the 
cultural and religious identities and customs of immigrant minorities, it is also 
important to create a clear set of laws and policies, and a firm set of 
implementation criteria that indicate that gross human rights violations, such as 
xenophobic and right-wing violence, domestic abuse and honour killings, will not 
be tolerated or excused. Immigrants do need to adapt to the dominant customs 
and political and social norms of Germany to successfully integrate themselves, 
and to contribute fully to German economic life – which is the reason for their 
recruitment in the first place. 
 
However committed Germany may be to the primacy of human rights, it is clear 
from examining the legal documents outlining immigration policy that there is 
great deal more to be done to ensure the primacy of immigrants’ rights, in 
particular those of immigrant women. If Germany could take a more progressive 
and open-minded stance on immigration, it could prompt other similarly 
exclusivist member states to follow suit, and this could filter up to a more open, 
rights-based immigration system at EU level as well. Immigration is part of 
Germany’s economic and social reality, and will continue to be so for the 
foreseeable future. As long as immigrants continue to move into Germany their 
families will continue to move with them, bringing women and children into the 
country as well. These women deserve the same rights as the men whom they join 
have, and all immigrants deserve the same social and economic rights as the 
native citizens of their host countries. Women’s rights are human rights, and 
human rights should no longer be a hollow term that politicians use to make their 
constituencies believe that people are being taken care of and respected. Human 
rights and women’s rights must be firmly entrenched if Germany’s rhetoric on the 
importance of integration and a less exclusive immigration regime is to mean 
anything at all.  
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Notes 
1 This term literally means ‘guest workers’. 
2 This event was caused, essentially, by an embargo by the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) sanctioned by Saudi Arabia in response to the West’s 
support of the Arab-Israeli War. 
3Also known as the former West Germany. The former East Germany was known as the 
German Democratic Republic, or GDR. 
4 Translated literally this means ‘policy towards foreigners’ and encompasses 
immigration, residence, integration and citizenship policy. 
5 Turkish guest workers began entering Germany after an agreement between the 
Turkish and German governments was signed in 1961, and Turkish workers formed the 
single biggest group of guest workers from late 1960s onwards. 
6 lit. ‘Foreigner’s Law’, passed in 1965 and revised in 1990.  
7 For a full discussion of the reform process and the issues it addressed see Green, 
Simon. 2004. The politics of exclusion: Institutions and immigration policy in 
contemporary Germany. (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press), 50–
78.  
8 See Hillmann, Felicitas. 1999. ‘A Look at the ‘Hidden Side’: Turkish Women in Berlin’s 
Ethnic Labour Market’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23:2, 
267-82.  
9 This is especially the case for non-nationals whose labour had been recruited during 
the pre-oil shock years, for example, Turks. 
10 Literally translated it means ‘Immigration Law’. 
11 Honour killings can be defined, broadly, as the murder by a male family member of a 
woman for reasons related to the perception or belief of her actions having brought 
shame on the whole family, for which the only remedy is her death. Recent honour 
killings in Germany have seen young women and mothers shot, drowned, stabbed and 
burned with acid. 
12 Upper house of the German parliament. 
13 For a full discussion of these restrictions see A Manual for Germany – Foreigners from 
Non-EU States: Family reunion. Available online at: http://www.handbuch-
deutschland.de/book/en/003_002_002_001.print.html. 
14 Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who migrate to Germany. 
15 See Inowlocki, Lena and Helma Lutz. 2000. ‘Hard Labour: The “Biographical Work” 
of a Turkish Migrant Woman in Germany’ in The European Journal of Women’s 
Studies, 7,30 –319; and Hillmann, 1999. 
16 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which 
all EU member states have ratified. 
 
                                                 
 
